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Abstract 
Incumbent firms struggle with new forms of 
competition in today’s increasingly digital 
environments. To leverage the benefits of innovation 
ecosystems they often shift focus from products to 
platforms. However, existing research provides limited 
insight into how firms actually implement this shift. 
Addressing this void, we have conducted a 
comparative case study where we adopt the concept of 
platform thinking to comprehend what capabilities 
incumbents need when engaging in innovation 
ecosystems and how those capabilities are developed. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Many of the world’s most valuable companies have 
made the leap from products to platforms [50]. Firms 
such as Apple, Google, and Amazon started as 
product-centric organizations, creating value by 
developing differentiated products for specific 
customer needs. Over the years, however, they have 
learned how to convert product users into platform 
users. They have also learned how to connect these 
users with third party actors, such as app developers, 
publishers, or advertisers. By charging fees for 
platform access they can now capture value from many 
different business transactions, rather than relying on a 
single revenue stream. 
As firms shift focus from products to platforms 
they seek to take advantage of broad innovation 
ecosystems that turn suppliers and competitors into 
complementors and partners. Such a platform focus 
encourages “a new type of scope economies” in the 
sense of leveraging the “resources of other firms to 
help produce complementary innovations” [12, p. 292]. 
Clearly, this leap from products to platforms 
promises a great deal for incumbent firms. However, 
they face many challenges in implementing this shift; 
they must be able to attract different kinds of users [4], 
keep users in ecosystems [10], control the output from 
ecosystems [18], exploit complements [45], and 
continuously reconfigure the various resources offered 
to ecosystem stakeholders [13].  
Existing research offers an increasingly detailed 
conceptual understanding of innovation ecosystem 
dynamics [17] and the central role of platforms in 
keeping ecosystems together [19, 33]. At the same 
time, it is argued that we must shed further light on 
how firms actually engage in innovation ecosystems, 
on what actions they take and what challenges they 
face [26]. Put differently, the research community calls 
for a better understanding of what particular 
capabilities are required [26, 27] and how these 
capabilities are developed [19, 40]. 
In this paper we adopt the concept of platform 
thinking to address this void in the literature. 
Combining contemporary platform literature and extant 
research on innovation ecosystems we develop a 
theoretical model of platform thinking, resting on 
eleven distinct capabilities. We then apply our model 
with the dual purpose to (1) demonstrate its value for 
understanding what capabilities incumbent firms need 
to develop, but also to (2) analyze how such 
capabilities are actually developed1.  
Previous research underlines that the leap from 
products to platforms typically involves a leap into the 
digital [47]. This pulls off a clash between an 
established product innovation regime and an 
upcoming competing logic of digital innovation [21, 
38], making the development of new capabilities 
complicated and risky. Therefore, to better understand 
how such competing concerns influence the emergence 
of new capabilities we have studied and compared four 
different firms in distinctly different industries. 
                                                          
1 The authors wish to acknowledge that this research is supported by 
Acando by providing access to its extensive industry network. 
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2. Platform Thinking 
 
Our research departs from Sawhney’s [36] original 
notion of platform thinking where the distinction 
between “core” and “derivatives” takes center stage. 
Given our focus on established firms making the leap 
from products to platforms, we view platform thinking 
as an approach where incumbents understand their core 
products as platforms that can be exposed to genuinely 
new innovation areas for generating complementary 
products and eventually new revenue streams. 
Synthesizing the innovation ecosystem literature and 
the platform literature we have identified four 
overarching dimensions that constitute platform 
thinking: stimulating value creation, capturing value, 
protecting value, and evolving ecosystem. We now 
present our theoretical framework, including key 
capabilities, and operationalizations (Table 1). 
 
2.1. Stimulate Value Creation 
  
In innovation ecosystems value creation is a 
collaborative process, resting on the success of 
multiple actors [2]. A focal actor – typically a platform 
owner – can stimulate such collaboration by promoting 
the overall health of the ecosystem [1], but also by 
actively engaging in co-creation to jointly create more 
value in the innovation ecosystem [1].  
To stimulate value creation focal actors must 
develop capability to motivate non-focals to participate 
in the innovation ecosystem. Research recognizes 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations [5]. Intrinsic 
motivations are non-tangible incentives, such as 
reputation, recognition, or intellectual challenge, while 
extrinsic motivations are external incentives, such as 
monetary compensations or future rewards. In platform 
ecosystems network effects make powerful extrinsic 
motivations. Direct network effects occur when 
increase in usage increases value for other users of the 
same type, while indirect network effects take place in 
multi-sided markets, where participation of one user 
group depends on the size of another user group [28]. 
Therefore, network effects may attract end-users by 
increased product diversity and complementors by a 
larger market. However, to trigger network effects and 
attract ecosystem participants a platform owner must 
ensure a sufficiently large installed base [19].  
Contemporary research identifies another, 
increasingly important mechanism for focal actors as to 
stimulate ecosystem participation; providing boundary 
resources. By sharing their own resources focal actors 
can build a common identity across intersecting social 
worlds [37] and provide unique value in the ecosystem 
that non-focal actors are not able to create themselves 
[25]. In this vein, they can support complementors in 
their creative work by transferring design capability 
[46]. There are numerous examples of internal re-
sources that a focal actor strategically can share with 
non-focal actors, such as know-how, equipment and 
technology, processes, data, R&D spillovers or access 
to delivery channels [1]. However, the concept is often 
used more specifically in reference to “software tools 
and regulations that serve as the interface for the 
arm’s-length relationship between the platform owner 
and the application developer” [20, p. 174]. It is 
generally argued that boundary resources enable 
generativity by providing external actors capability to 
develop products or services without involvement from 
the platform owner [48]. 
While stimulation of value creation is a key 
element of platform thinking, research underlines that 
an innovation ecosystem will not gain enough 
momentum unless it becomes reasonably self-
sustaining. Seeking such autonomy in the ecosystem, 
focal actors have to develop capability for establishing 
so called co-opetition. That is, structures rewarding 
relationships that simultaneously involve both 
competition and cooperation [7]. Collaborative 
structures set out to connect ecosystem participants, 
simplify interactions and lower transaction costs 
between them [25]. Such collaborative communities 
are able “to divide up design tasks via modular design 
architectures” [2, p. 1406], making them particularly 
skilled in resolving innovation problems that require 
cumulative knowledge [5]. By developing competitive 
markets focal actors allow themselves to pit innovators 
against each other to encourage more heterogeneous 
innovations as contributions can come from external 
actors in various settings. This way they do not bear 
any risk in the early innovation process as they only 
have to reward successful initiatives [5]. 
 
2.2. Capture Value 
  
In contrast to value creation, value capture takes 
place on a firm-level and concerns how different actors 
restructure their competitive advantage and eventually 
reap profits from innovation ecosystems [34]. While 
the literature discusses several mechanisms to capture 
value from ecosystems, focal actors typically need to 
develop capabilities for deriving profit from trans-
actions, spillovers, and new value propositions. 
The opportunity to capture value from transactions 
materialize when the ecosystem constitutes a multi-
sided market, where products or services that are 
controlled by the focal actor facilitate interaction 
between different groups of users [16]. 
Spillovers can be used to generate profit in two 
ways. First, focal actors may sell or out-license 
resources, intellectual property or information that are 
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generated inside or outside the firm and that remains 
unused in relation to the focal actor’s core offer [11]. 
However, a great deal of spillovers are early, immature 
innovations without an explicit market. Such spillovers 
may be brought to the market indirectly, as spin-off 
companies, or donated as spinouts to generate demand 
for other products that the donor continues to sell [45]. 
Finally, product diversity is a major asset in 
platform ecosystems, allowing incumbents to profit 
from new value propositions [6]. Beside additional 
direct revenue streams various complements may be 
used to increase the value of a firm’s core products 
offer [45], but also to reduce risks associated with 
radical innovation [42]. When shifting from products 
to platforms firms often adopt hybrid business models 
to profit from existing core products while 
simultaneously engage in new value propositions [50]. 
 
2.3. Protect Value 
  
A focal actor must continuously develop and 
exercise capabilities to protect the value created in its 
ecosystem. As such, it has to consider its own position, 
the ecosystem’s boundaries, and the outcomes of 
ecosystem activities. In protecting its own position, a 
focal actor must restrict access to the platform by 
establishing effective governance mechanisms. 
Properly designed, such platform governance may 
“appropriately bound participant behavior without 
excessively constraining the desired level of 
generativity” [43].  Thereby it can be used to balance 
inherent ecosystem tensions, e.g. between control and 
autonomy or between collective and individual forces. 
If a focal actor tries to overexploit an ecosystem it will 
ultimately drain the ecosystem and risk its own 
competitiveness [25]. Hence, focal actors cannot just 
protect created value, but they also have to ensure a 
fair distribution of value across the ecosystem [9]. 
To protect ecosystem boundaries focal actors must 
fight envelopment attacks, where another platform 
provider seeks to enter the ecosystem by combining 
platforms [15]. They must also be proactive in 
preventing stakeholders from engaging in competing 
ecosystems [10] or in opportunistic behavior [34]. Eco-
system boundaries can be protected through lock-in 
effects, increasing switching costs [28]. Although lock-
in effects are effective in many situations, collaborative 
environments tend to fall apart if members are not 
confident that the focal actor will not exploit their 
contribution. Under those circumstances soft 
mechanisms, such as trust and relation building, may 
keep actors in the ecosystem and avoid opportunistic 
behavior [5, 34]. 
Finally, focal actors must protect innovation 
outcomes, created in the innovation ecosystem, from 
competing ecosystems. Although first mover 
advantages may put the focal actor ahead of 
competition, it is not a guarantee for sustainable 
competitive advantage [39]. Traditionally, legal 
mechanisms, such as contracts or patents guide 
innovation appropriability and protect innovations 
through exclusive access [34]. However, in a platform 
ecosystem selective revealing of intellectual property 
[24] may offer similar protection, without imposing 
legal protection mechanisms. 
 
2.4. Evolve Ecosystem 
  
Platform ecosystems are in constant change. To 
preserve competitive advantage over time focal actors 
must actively engage in the evolution of ecosystems 
and continuously reconsider how they stimulate, 
capture, and protect value.  To keep creative 
momentum and ensure ecosystem competitiveness they 
must develop capabilities for expanding the ecosystem, 
securing appropriate incorporation mechanisms, and 
continuously improving platform performance. 
As focal actors seek to expand ecosystems they 
often rely on options thinking, allowing them to 
identify, develop and realize new innovations without 
the obligation to invest further in an unfavorable 
innovation [35]. In this vein, options thinking offers a 
way to explore new ecosystem resources and actors, 
while spreading risk and keeping investments limited. 
When expanding an ecosystem focal actors must watch 
out for unstructured developments jeopardizing the 
firm’s own position. Any growth strategy must 
therefore carefully balance between stability of the 
ecosystem and the need for new innovations [43]. 
To assist the evolution of an ecosystem focal actors 
also must invest in securing adequate incorporation 
mechanisms for integration of external innovations into 
their own internal processes [45]. This requires internal 
structures for securing the absorptive capacity of the 
firm [49]. In setting up such structures it has proved 
essential to invest in an open culture that encourages 
external collaboration [29, 11]. 
Finally, focal actors must continuously improve 
platform performance to preserve a central position as 
the ecosystem evolves. In doing so, they must pay 
attention to how boundary resources come into being 
and evolve. More precisely, they have to recognize that 
boundary resources are tuned in a temporally emergent 
and iterative change process, where the platform owner 
has a facilitative role. Boundary resources are not 
primarily designed by the firm that owns the platform 
infrastructure, but rather materialize from collisions 
between artifacts within and across multiple 
organizational and technological contexts [13]. 
Striving for improved platform performance, focal 
4768
actors should seek to reduce complexity for innovators 
and support them in creating more specialized niches 
[19]. In doing so, they must scan the ecosystem for 
generic solutions, restructure them so that they can be 
re-utilized by innovators, and incorporate them in the 
platform. This process is referred to as the general-
ization and specialization of boundary resources [23]. 
 
Table 1 Theoretical Framework 
 Capability Operationalization Key References 
St
im
u
la
t
e 
va
lu
e 
cr
ea
ti
o
n
  Provide incentives Trigger network effects Gawer and Cusumano [19] 
 Provide boundary resources Ghazawneh and Henfridsson [20] 
Establish structures for 
co-opetition 
Develop collaborative communities Baldwin and von Hippel [2] 
Develop competitive markets Boudreau and Lakhani [5] 
C
a
p
tu
re
 
V
a
lu
e 
Profit from transactions Facilitate transactions between user groups Eisenmann, et al. [16] 
Profit from spillovers Out-license or sell spillovers Chesbrough, et al. [11] 
 Embrace spinoffs/spinouts West and Gallagher [45] 
Profit from new value 
propositions 
Exploit complements to reinforce core product Boudreau [6] 
Adopt hybrid business models Zhu and Furr [50] 
P
ro
te
ct
 V
a
lu
e Protect firm position Establish platform governance mechanisms Wareham, et al. [43] 
 Ensure even distribution of ecosystem resources Cennamo and Santalo [9] 
Protect ecosystem 
boundaries 
Establish lock-in mechanisms Katz and Shapiro [28] 
Invest in trust and loyalty to the ecosystem Ritala, et al. [34] 
Protect innovation 
outcomes 
Exercise legal mechanisms Teece [39] 
Implement selective revealing  Henkel, et al. [24] 
Ev
o
lv
e 
ec
o
sy
st
em
 Expand the ecosystem Adopt Options Thinking Sambamurthy, et al. [35] 
Balance between stability and growth Wareham, et al. [43] 
Secure incorporation 
mechanisms 
Establish absorptive capacity Zahra and George [49] 
Establish open culture and political will Katz and Allen [29] 
Enhance platform 
performance 
Tune boundary resources Eaton, et al. [13] 
Ensure generalization and specialization Henfridsson, et al. [23] 
 
3. Research Design  
In this research we have made a comparative case 
study [8] to generate theory [14] within the field of 
platform thinking. We adopted this design to analyze 
the social phenomena of platform thinking across 
different settings and with the ambition to generate 
more general research [3]. Searching for cases we 
identified four dominant Swedish industries: media, 
automotive, pharmaceutical, and retail. These 
industries were selected based on their polar positions 
(in terms of industry characteristics and innovation 
prerequisites2) to ensure a diverse sample [14]. Within 
these industries, the twenty largest firms made our 
sampling frame. One organization in each industry was 
selected to exemplify incumbents within that particular 
category [8]: AutoCorp, a global car manufacturer, 
MediaCorp, a major national TV station, StoreCorp, a 
food retailer with national coverage, and PharmaCorp, 
a global pharmaceutical company.  
Interviews were the main data source in our 
comparative case study. Searching for respondents we 
initially used LinkedIn and identified candidates on the 
                                                          
2 Based on the Industry Classification Benchmark, icbenchmark.com 
basis of formal roles (Table 2). Trying to make sure 
that respondents were selected based on their relevance 
to understanding platform thinking in multiple contexts 
[8], they were required to have managerial positions 
within Innovation/R&D, Business development, or 
Digitalization/IT. All in all, we conducted, recorded 
and transcribed 18 interviews, each lasting one hour. 
Table 2 Respondents 
AutoCorp StoreCorp 
IT Dir. (A1) Business Strategy Dir. (S1) 
 Innovation Manager (A2) IT Manager (S2) 
Service Manager (A3) Digital Strategist (S3) 
Strategy Dir. (A4) Business Strategist (S4) 
MediaCorp PharmaCorp 
Business Development Dir. 
(M1) 
 
 
 
 
Open Innovation  
Manager (P1) 
Business Developer (M2) IT Strategist (P2) 
Digital Strategist (M3) Patent Advisor (P3) 
Business Strategist (M4) Innovation Manager (P4) 
Product Strategist (M5) Innovation Hub Manager (P5) 
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The software Nvivo was used to code and analyze 
the empirical material. We applied a set of coding 
rules, derived from our theoretical framework, and 
employed check-coding throughout the coding process 
[31]. After the initial coding the empirical material was 
thematized to establish a rich understanding of 
emergent platform thinking among the studied firms. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Stimulate Value Creation 
  
The investigated firms all have something that 
naturally incentivize external actors, such as brand 
value, market reach or industry experience. Despite 
this, they often lack capability to reach out to external 
innovators. Being an R&D company, PharmaCorp 
shares its research insights in the form of clinical 
compounds through an open innovation portal. These 
are resources that external researchers can use at no (or 
very low) cost to advance their own research. External 
actors can also get access to PharmaCorp’s 
infrastructure to excel their innovation capacity and 
lower innovation barriers. AutoCorp provides tempo-
rary digital car keys to service providers, allowing 
them to deliver goods and provide services directly 
across AutoCorp’s installed base of cars. This suggests 
that AutoCorp views the car as a platform for external 
innovation and the digital key as a boundary resource. 
Sharing information and data is recognized as an 
area with huge potential. At AutoCorp there is an 
initiative where its cars share information on road 
conditions to authorities to improve traffic information. 
MediaCorp has arranged hackathons, centered on 
consumer behavior data. These initiatives clearly 
reflect emerging platform thinking but at the same 
time, respondents across the studied firms agree it is 
difficult to identify what information to share. 
Turning to structures for co-opetition, PharmaCorp 
utilizes a competitive market by pitting external actors’ 
ideas or research against each other in innovation 
challenges. Winning contributions are offered financial 
awards or partnerships. All four incumbents have also 
established physical and digital spaces where they 
collaborate with external actors. PharmaCorp has used 
its open innovation portal to create a collaborative 
community for scientists. The rest of the studied firms 
run workshops to provide capability for collaboration 
with external actors. The respondents describe that 
external actors are happy to join these initiatives even 
without financial compensation as they get to meet 
new people, learn new things and solve problems 
together. “Those are the incentives, you don’t get 
anything specific out of it other than, hopefully, a 
widened perspective and new ideas” (M1). Although 
these workshops mimic collaborative communities, 
they tend to be one-off events rather than ongoing 
efforts. Consequently, while referring to ecosystems, 
most collaborations are still done in traditional 
customer-supplier relations “We are definitely part of 
an ecosystem but it is not really an even relationship. 
We are the client and they are suppliers” (S1). 
 
4.2. Capture Value 
 
AutoCorp’s initiative with in-car deliveries, based 
on a digital key, is a recently developed example where 
platform thinking offers capability to derive profits 
from transactions. In this initiative AutoCorp connects 
drivers and service providers, while charging service 
provider for the opportunity to deliver goods to cars. 
The studied incumbents also try to develop capabilities 
for profiting on spillovers. StoreCorp recently started 
to exploit customer data and sell it to suppliers. The 
challenge lies in turning the large volumes of raw data 
to insights. A respondent from StoreCorp argued that 
“the least of our problems is if we will be able to 
charge the suppliers […] this is information that we 
have and they want” (S1). PharmaCorp 
commercialized some of its spillovers as it out-licensed 
clinical compounds and created spin-off ventures from 
unused innovations. Still, the main objective of 
exploiting spillovers is to strengthen innovation 
capacity by allowing PharmaCorp “to access people 
with unique expertise that we may not have within the 
organization. That’s difficult to put a price on” (P1). 
PharmaCorp and AutoCorp also try to increase brand 
value by sharing clinical compounds and information 
on road conditions.  
Each of the studied firms have developed 
complements to strengthen their core value pro-
position. AutoCorp has developed a new infotainment 
platform that is included when customers purchase a 
larger entertainment package. StoreCorp has comp-
lemented its core offer by adding new in-store services, 
such as health check-ups and coffee shops. MediaCorp 
extend its content on social media, which increases the 
consumption of core services and PharmaCorp can 
strengthen its core value by developing digital 
solutions related to their medicines. Altogether, this 
indicates emerging platform thinking as StoreCorp, 
MediaCorp and PharmaCorp increasingly view the 
store, the media content and the pill as platforms to 
which complementary services can be developed. 
Furthermore, the investigated incumbents recognize 
that they have to develop hybrid business models as 
traditional approaches are challenged by digitalization. 
MediaCorp tries to realize complementary profits from 
digital products so they can ensure “a digital business 
that’s large enough when the core business totally 
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drops” (M5). Smaller revenue streams that were once 
overlooked are now becoming increasingly important. 
However, the studied incumbents’ core businesses still 
generate large profits, preventing a shift in behavior: 
“We want to protect the core business and sell cars 
rather than go into the unknown where you don’t know 
how anything is going to play out” (A3).  
 
4.3. Protect Value 
 
The four incumbents are not particularly concerned 
about competition from non-traditional actors, but 
generally see different ecosystems as opportunities for 
collaboration. Despite these optimistic reflections, 
some of the respondents are uncertain about how their 
firm’s position might change due to digitalization. As a 
response to this, some of the studied firms tend to 
move away from collaborations altogether: “we 
develop the complementary services in house and own 
the platform and the web shop ourselves” (M1). 
Furthermore, all firms consider it essential to 
strategically select whom to share their resources with. 
PharmaCorp has governance mechanisms in place for 
judging the relevance and feasibility of collaborations: 
“we only initiate collaborations with researchers that 
we are confident have the ability to achieve what they 
set out to do” (P4). The respondents also indicate that 
they have established switching costs and lock-in 
effects in different ways. StoreCorp relies on a strong 
customer loyalty program, providing capability to 
protect its ecosystem, and MediaCorp ensures loyalty 
by providing niche content for the Swedish market. 
AutoCorp suggest that its first-mover position in 
digital keys may protect it from competition. At 
PharmaCorp there is a strong focus on ecosystem 
relations built on trust, providing the firm “an 
advantage the day we are looking for a partner. We 
have already seen that it pays off and that is just pure 
decency, not a requirement we put on them [the 
external innovators]. [...] It is a result of trust, good 
relations and goodwill from both parties” (P5). The 
determination to create strong informal relations 
implies emerging platform thinking as the respondents 
realize that protecting innovations through legal means 
might not always maximize the value gain. Even so, 
PharmaCorp and AutoCorp are the only ones explicitly 
arguing investments in trust offers capability to protect 
value. Generally, the studied incumbents rely heavily 
on legal mechanisms to protect their innovations.  
 
4.4. Evolve Ecosystem 
 
All four incumbents have established separate 
innovation units that are disconnected from the core 
business. In doing so, they have developed capability 
for continuous exploration of external innovation 
environments. MediaCorp and PharmaCorp make 
small investments in initiatives and innovations that 
might not be profitable today but could offer new 
sources of value in the future. At StoreCorp the 
employees experiment with new technologies to learn 
for future projects. The IT Manager underlines that 
such activities are difficult to legitimize in an 
incumbent firm: “Sometimes I have to do an inverted 
business case and ask: how much will it cost to not do 
this? It will cost us an enormous amount of money, we 
will have a slow start and we will have to spend a lot of 
money in six months just to catch up” (S2). These 
initiatives indicate emerging platform thinking as the 
incumbents utilize options thinking to invest in 
opportunities that have an uncertain outcome but 
provide a variety of options in the future.  
The studied firms also set out to establish arenas for 
long-term cross-fertilization between external and 
internal innovation. The most prominent example is 
PharmaCorp’s launch of an innovation hub where 
small companies can collaborate with one another and 
with the incumbent. The hub has allowed 
PharmaCorp’s employees to interact with external 
companies and regularly exchange knowledge. There 
are also structures for the hub management to revise 
what boundary resources they share with the external 
actors in order to further enhance their innovative 
capacity. Over time, this arena has proved highly 
supportive in the integration of external innovations. 
Even though there are some further examples of 
similar initiatives among the other incumbents, most 
firms demonstrate flaws in absorptive capacity and 
open culture. Being aware of these weaknesses, they 
all tried to build a more positive attitude towards 
external innovation by repeatedly presenting successful 
innovation initiatives.  
However, one large challenge to overcome among 
the studied firms is that they currently develop a 
majority of the complementary innovations in-house or 
in traditional supplier relations. At the same time, the 
studied incumbents lack sufficient resources to identify 
and act on the opportunities necessary to keep up a 
competitive pace of innovation. The innovation hub 
seems to have overcome some of these problems as it 
entails generative characteristics by providing a 
foundation for external innovators: “We might have a 
theoretical idea that if we mix [competence] A with B 
we will get something awesome. Unfortunately, we 
cannot prioritize that but what we can do is to put two 
such companies next to each other and see what 
happens […] As a result we have seven companies that 
have established formal collaborations with each 
other” (P5). 
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Table 3 Evidence of platform thinking at PharmaCorp (P), AutoCorp (A), StoreCorp (S), and MediaCorp (M). 
 
St
im
u
la
te
 
Provide incentives 
 Shared clinical compounds to enable further innovations by external actors (P) 
 Shared consumer data in workshops to generate new ideas (M) 
 Shared information on road conditions do drive innovation around the connected car (A) 
 Offered access to connected cars by sharing a digital key with service providers (A) 
 Offered partnerships or financial compensation to increase participation in innovation challenges (P) 
 Provided access to advanced instruments to spur innovation in small companies (P) 
Establish structures for co-opetition 
 Provided physical and digital spaces for collaboration with external actors (P, A, M) 
 Established innovation challenges to engage external actors in the generation of problem solutions (P) 
C
a
p
tu
re
 
Profit from transactions 
 Charged service providers for in-car delivery of goods (A) 
Profit from spillovers 
 Out-licensed compounds to external actors (P)  
 Created spinoff ventures based on infant innovations (P) 
 Sold information on consumer behavior to wholesalers/producers (S) 
 Increased innovation capacity by sharing clinical data to tap into the expertise of external researchers (P) 
 Increased brand value by sharing information on road conditions with public authorities (A) 
 Increased brand value by sharing insights from non-strategic areas with the academia (P) 
Profit from new value propositions 
 Increased the effect of medicines by launching digital complements (P) 
 Enhanced driving experience by launching semi-open infotainment platform (A) 
 Introduced in-store health services and coffee shops to strengthen their marketplace (S) 
 Reinforced core services by providing additional content on social media (M) 
 Sold digital product packages (M) 
P
ro
te
ct
 
Protect firm position 
 Established teams to evaluate collaborations with external actors (P) 
Protect ecosystem boundaries 
 Established informal relations with external actors based on trust (P) 
 Sought first-mover advantages by establishing an innovation ecosystem around the digital key (A) 
 Established loyalty systems to increased switching costs by (S) 
 Provided niche content to increase consumer loyalty (M) 
Protect innovation outcomes 
 Relied on legal mechanisms to protect innovation outcomes (P, A, S, M) 
Ev
o
lv
e 
Expand the ecosystem 
 Established separate innovation units, disconnected from the core business (P, A, S, M) 
 Invested in new business areas and technologies to explore future opportunities (P, M) 
 Experimented with new digital technologies to learn about trends and developments (S) 
Secure incorporation mechanisms 
 Integrated start-up technology with existing digital services (A) 
 Placed employees in external companies to learn new practices and incorporate external knowledge (P) 
Enhance platform performance 
 Introduced a practice for continuously reassessing what resources to share with external actors (P) 
 Provided an innovation hub for co-creation of products and services (P) 
 
5. Discussion  
 
 As summarized in Table 3, our comparative case study 
offers important insights into the manifestations of 
platform thinking in incumbent firms. By applying our 
theoretical model (Table 1) we have provided a portrait 
of what capabilities incumbents have to develop as 
they shift focus from products to platforms. Drawing 
on this empirical evidence, we now seek to discuss 
how such capabilities are developed. 
 
5.1. From Strategic Sourcing to Targeted 
Seeding 
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To stimulate value creation in external ecosystems 
an incumbent firm must find ways to empower 
ecosystem actors by sharing various boundary 
resources [20] and setting up structures for ecosystem 
co-opetition [5]. Our study indicates that incumbents 
are generally well aware of requisite capabilities and 
potential rewards. At the same time, the comparative 
case study shows that such attempts to stimulate 
external value creation typically triggers substantial 
resistance, ranging from privacy and regulatory issues 
to identifying boundary resources and getting approval 
for sharing them. This resistance must be understood in 
relation to incumbents’ established practices, where 
internal activities are coordinated by up-front 
specification of innovation outcomes. In this vein, the 
new initiatives uncovered a tension between internal 
and external collaboration [38, 33], as they forced the 
incumbents to move away from established internal 
practices. To develop capabilities for stimulating value 
creation the firms had to maneuver this fundamental 
tension. The four incumbents in this study all rely hard 
on traditional supplier relations, where goods and 
services are acquired on the basis of strategic sourcing. 
Therefore, to handle the tensions between internal and 
external from growing out of control, they often ended 
up with specialized ecosystem setups, such as 
PharmaCorp’s sharing of clinical compounds, 
AutoCorp’s digital key, or MediaCorp’s hackathons. 
Although being open to unconventional and 
unexpected outcomes among external contributors, 
these initiatives were given a rather precise direction 
through specific staring conditions, reasonably well 
aligned with internal practices. This suggests that 
incumbents firms, to develop capabilities for 
stimulating value creation, should initially engage in 
targeted seeding where the scope of the ecosystem is 
intentionally limited. 
 
5.2. From Core Products to Related 
Complements 
 
To capture value from external ecosystems 
incumbents must look beyond existing business models 
and learn how to derive profits from transactions [16], 
exploit spillovers [11], and capitalize on radically new 
value propositions [6]. The incumbents in our study 
were well aware of this shift and realized that existing 
markets may transform at a pace where they do not 
have the time to react before they are obsolete [44]. 
Therefore, they persistently asked questions, such as; 
what if patients and hospitals demand to pay for 
outcomes, not medicines? What if drivers no longer 
want to own cars? What if customers buy a majority of 
groceries online? These questions triggered a shift in 
focus, from core products to yet unknown 
complements, with the potential to open up alternative 
revenue streams. As illustrated by AutoCorp’s in-car 
delivery this, in turn, brought a strong focus on the 
process of innovation – separate from its outcome – 
since the digital key became a boundary resource to be 
utilized by external actors. However, the emerging 
focus on innovation processes and generation of 
complements triggered resistance among incumbents 
since they all derive large profits from a core product. 
Insofar as investments are made in complements, it is 
traditionally viewed as a way to increase profits from 
that core. Therefore, to maneuver the structural tension 
between a product focus and a process focus [38], the 
incumbents tried to develop hybrid business models 
allowing for exploitation of multiple revenue streams, 
while still retaining revenue generated from their core 
businesses [27, 50]. MediaCorp’s new channels for 
content distribution and PharmaCorp’s digital 
complements for existing drugs illustrate that the 
incumbents typically tried to establish such hybrids by 
searching for options where existing business were not 
immediately threatened. This suggests that incumbents 
firms, to develop capabilities for capturing value, have 
to implement the shift from core to complements 
gradually by carefully identifying new revenue streams 
that resonate with, rather than challenge, existing 
business models.  
 
5.3. From Controlled Processes to Selective 
Recruitment  
 
Engagement with external innovation ecosystems 
force incumbent firms to develop capability for 
protecting its own position [43], ecosystem boundaries 
[28], and innovation outcomes [39]. The organizations 
in our study all recognized that external ecosystems, 
characterized by co-opetition [7], will underperform or 
die if managed on the basis of traditional control. In 
this context, key assets such as central store locations 
or advanced production processes would offer little 
protection and limited competitive advantage. In 
response, they launched initiatives such as 
PharmaCorp’s innovation hub to rapidly build new 
ecosystem relations [24]. Other efforts, such as 
MediaCorp’s initiative on providing niche content or 
StoreCorp’s loyalty program, were specifically focused 
on the delicate issue of creating trust among ecosystem 
members [34]. Despite these emerging signs of 
platform thinking formal control, based on contracts, 
secrecy, and patents, was deeply anchored in 
organizational practices. Therefore, to develop 
capabilities for protecting value the firms had to strike 
a balance between their own need for control and 
ecosystem members’ need for autonomy [43, 22, 38]. 
Rather than trying to resolve this tension by restricting 
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autonomy within ecosystems, the incumbents focused 
on restricting entrance. The innovation hub and the 
ecosystem around the digital key are salient examples, 
where well known and respected market actors were 
selectively invited. This suggests that incumbents 
firms, to develop capabilities for protecting the 
ecosystem, should carefully choose whom to 
collaborate with by exercising selective recruitment of 
ecosystem members. 
 
5.4. From Long-Range Product Planning to 
Resource Orchestration 
 
For ecosystems to remain healthy over time, focal 
actors need to continuously expand its borders [43], 
secure incorporation mechanisms [49], and enhance 
platform performance [13]. The four incumbents in our 
study demonstrated a will to develop such a long-term 
agenda for continuous shaping of innovation 
environments: they invested in experimental 
technologies, explored options thinking, experimented 
with open platform solutions, and developed novel 
boundary resources. Often these progressive initiatives 
triggered resistance from the organization for the 
simple reason that they challenged existing 
organizational identity, centered on long-range product 
planning. Since identity becomes intertwined in 
routines, procedures, and beliefs it is often difficult to 
develop new requisite capability that is not consistent 
with existing capabilities [41, 38]. Addressing this 
tension between existing and requisite innovation 
capability the investigated incumbents often decided to 
establish independent innovation units, where they 
could freely explore new forms of innovation without 
direct impact on daily operations. PharmaCorp’s 
innovation hub was probably the best illustration of 
how an incumbent can continuously enhance its 
performance through such an independent unit. In this 
case, the hub offered PharmaCorp capability to grow 
the ecosystem in a controlled manner and coordinate 
interactions between its members. The hub made a 
self-sustaining environment where different 
stakeholders were able to benefit from and contribute 
to a shared boundary resource base and use it to co-
create innovations. To remain attractive over time, 
PharmaCorp listened carefully to the needs of the 
external actors and continuously tuned thed boundary 
resources to improve the offer to external actors [13, 
23] and enable generativity [20]. This typically meant 
that they transformed existing internal resources, such 
as equipment or knowledge, into accessible boundary 
resources. These resources could then be used by hub 
members in radically new ways without challenging 
the internal identity of PharmaCorp. This suggests that 
incumbents firms, to develop capabilities for evolving 
ecosystems, initially should seek to establish 
independent, yet close innovation environments. In 
such environments they can exercise continuous 
resource orchestration to build generative capacity and 
trigger new innovations, yet without challenging 
existing firm identity. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This study contributes to the literature on platforms 
and innovation ecosystems by providing an answer to 
how incumbents can make the leap from products to 
platforms. It offers a theoretical model of platform 
thinking for better understanding what capabilities 
incumbent firms need to develop. Applying the model 
we then draw important conclusions on how such 
capabilities are actually developed. Our work suggests 
that the clash between established product innovation 
practices and an upcoming competing logic plays a 
critical role in how such capabilities emerge. We see 
an opportunity for future research to further uncover 
how tension and contradiction shape platform thinking. 
Such research could engage specialized theoretical 
framings, such as paradox [30] or ambidexterity [32]. 
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